We analyze the possibility of e¢cient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A crucial role is played by the sign of the derivatives that measure how valuation functions depend on others' signals. If valuations are increasing functions of other agents' signals, it is more di¢cult to achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent values than with private values (where the respective derivatives are zero.) In contrast, if valuations are decreasing functions of other agents' signals, it is easier to achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent values. Our results unify and generalize the insights of Cramton et al. [1987] , Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] , and Akerlof [1970] .
Introduction
We inquire whether e¢cient trade can take place in environments where the agents' valuations depend on their own private information and on the private information of other agents. Such interdependence is natural in many trading situations, e.g., when a seller has private information about the quality of the good which in ‡uences the valuations of both the seller and a potential buyer. Especially in situations where property rights are initially dispersed among several agents (e.g., a partnership) it is natural to assume that each agent has private information that also determines the other agents' valuations. For an illustration, consider the situation where each partner is responsible for a particular project (or client, or operative part of the business, etc...) and where the projects are not ¤ Fieseler: McKinsey Consulting; Kittsteiner, Moldovanu: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, Seminargebäude A5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. We wish to thank the German Science Foundation for …nancial help through SFB 504 and GK "Finanz-und Guetermaerkte" at the University of Mannheim. We have greatly bene…ted from the comments made by an associated editor and by two anonymous referees. We are also grateful to Jörg Nikutta and seminar participants at Bonn, Mannheim, University College London, and Tilburg for helpful remarks. e-mail: mold@pool.uni-mannheim.de related to each other. It is clear that an estimate of the value of the entire business can be made only by having information on all projects. In addition to the "standard" case where private information in ‡uences all agents' valuations in the same direction (e.g., if this information is about quality) situations where "good" news for one agent turns out to be "bad" news for other agents are conceivable 1 . As an example, consider the following excerpt taken from the Economist, 2001, which describes actions taken by partners owning Formula 1 motor racing: "...it would not be in Mr. Ecclestone's long-term interest to forgo a deal which could only enhance the value of his family's remaining 50% stake in SLEC...the other 50% stake in SLEC, owned by EM.TV, a debt-ridden German media company, is up for sale. ... The uncertainty created by the dispute between Mr. Eccelstone and Mr. Mosley might depress the value of EM.TV holding. Could that work to Mr. Ecclestone's advantage ? Quite possibly. The lower the value of EM.TV's stake, the higher the relative value of an option Mr. Ecclestone holds to sell a further 25% of SLEC to EM.TV for around $1 billion -and the better the deal Mr. Ecclestone might be able to extract for surrendering the option." Our paper has two parts. We …rst show how results from the auction and mechanism design literature with private values can be adapted in order to analyze the possibility of e¢cient trade in models with interdependent values. The second part illustrates the advantages of this approach by analyzing in detail several trading situations with interdependent values, and in particular the dissolution of a partnership.
The analysis employs three main steps:
1. If signals are independent 2 , we show that a Revenue Equivalence Theorem (in the tradition of Myerson's [1981] pioneering contribution) holds for incentive compatible mechanisms in the interdependent valuation case 3 .
truthful revelation. Hence, we have to use a re…nement of the CGV approach. We adapt for our purposes the mechanism described in Maskin [1992] for a one-sided auction setting with one indivisible unit. Achieving incentive compatible value maximization is easy: the construction hinges on a single-crossing property which ensures that the value-maximizing allocation is monotone in the agents' signals.
3. Finally, using Revenue Equivalence, we note that it su¢ces to analyze the conditions under which generalized CGV mechanisms (which are incentive compatible and value-maximizing) satisfy individual rationality and budget-balancedness. For private values, a similar approach has been used by Williams [1999] and Krishna and Perry [1998] .
It is important to note that in the recent literature on one-sided auction settings with interdependent values 4 , the seller (whose private information does not play a role) is a "residual claimant" and receives all payments from the buyers. Budget-balancedness is therefore costless and it is automatically satis…ed. Hence, the type of problem posed in the present paper is completely absent in that literature 5 . Our …rst application concerns the dissolution of a partnership. Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1987] look at situations where each one of several agents owns a fraction of a good, and where agents have independent private values. Assuming symmetric distributions of agents' valuations, they prove that e¢cient trade is always possible if the agents' initial shares are equal 6 . We analyze a model that uses the symmetry assumptions made by Cramton et. al., and where the private and common value components are separable. A comparison of the cases with private and interdependent values reveals that a crucial role is played by the sign of the derivatives of the common value components (note that the private values case is exactly characterized by setting these derivatives equal to zero.)
If valuations are increasing functions of other agents' signals, it is more di¢cult to achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent values than with private values, since the information revealed ex-post is always "bad news" and the agents must be cautious in order to avoid the respective (i.e. winner's or loser's) curses. Even if initial shares are equal, it is not always possible to dissolve a partnership e¢ciently. Surprisingly, this result continues to hold for arbitrarily small common value components. Indeed, for any 4 See Maskin [1992] , Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [1996] , Ausubel [1997] , Dasgupta and Maskin [2000] , and Perry and Reny [1999] . 5 Ignoring individual rationality or budget balancedness, Jehiel and Moldovanu [1998] show that valuemaximization is, per-se, inconsistent with incentive compatibility if valuations are interdependent and if di¤erent coordinates of a multi-dimensional signal in ‡uence utilities in di¤erent alternatives (as in a general model of multi-object auctions). 6 Schweizer [1998] has generalized this result by showing that, even if agents' types are not drawn from the same distribution, there always exists an initial distribution of property rights such that, ex-post, the partnership can be e¢ciently dissolved. symmetric and separable valuations that are increasing in other agents' signals, we can construct a symmetric distribution function such that e¢cient dissolution is impossible, no matter what the initial distribution of property rights is.
If valuations are decreasing functions of other agents' signals, the additional information revealed ex-post is always a "blessing", and it turns out that it is easier to achieve e¢cient trade with interdependent valuations. We show that, in this case, there exists an open set of partnerships (around the equal partnership) that can always be dissolved e¢ciently.
An important special case of the partnership model is the situation where, ex-ante, the property rights belong to one agent. In a bilateral private values framework, Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] show that e¢cient trade is possible only in a setting where it is common knowledge that the buyer's lowest valuation exceeds the seller's highest valuation. The introduction of interdependent values allows us to connect the Myerson-Satterthwaite result to Akerlof's famous market for lemons [1970] . Akerlof examines a bilateral trading situation where only the seller has private information, but this information in ‡uences both traders' valuations. He gives an example where e¢cient trade is not possible even if it is common knowledge that the buyer's valuation always exceeds the seller's valuation 7 . With extreme ex-ante ownership, the "worst-o¤" types of traders are unambiguously de…ned, and we can relax some assumptions made for the analysis of partnerships. We display a general existence condition for e¢cient trade that generalizes and uni…es both Myerson-Satterthwaite's and Akerlof's classical contributions. We also show how e¢cient trade can take place (even if its possibility is not common knowledge) if agents' valuations are decreasing in other agents' signals. This positive result complements the negative result obtained by Gresik [1991] 8 for the case of valuations that increase in other agents' signals. Gresik derived an existence condition for e¢cient trade as a by-product of his characterization of second-best bilateral mechanisms for several traders with interdependent values 9 . This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. In section 3 we construct value-maximizing, incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations, and we use a revenue equivalence result in order to derive conditions under which 7 In that environment it su¢ces to analyze simple …xed-price mechanisms. Because private information in our paper is two-sided, we cannot restrict attention to price mechanisms, and the analysis is more complex. A detailed analysis of the Akerlof one-sided example using mechanism design techniques can be found in Myerson [1985] and Samuelson [1984] , which constructs second-best mechanisms. 8 Other papers focused on impossibility results: Spier [1994] and Schweizer [1989] study models of pretrial negotiation where the outcome of a trial depends on both parties' signals. They observe that not going to trial (which is e¢cient) cannot occur with probability one. Bester and Wärneyard [1998] study a model of con ‡ict resolution where agents are uncertain about each other's …ghting potential, and observe that con ‡ict must arise with positive probability even if peaceful settlement is always e¢cient. 9 Since the result is obtained via the solution of a variational problem, Gresik's approach depends on certain assumptions about virtual valuations. Such assumptions are not needed in our treatment such mechanisms are budget balanced and individually rational. In section 4 we generalize the Cramton et al. [1987] environment to the case with interdependent valuations. In section 5 we brie ‡y look at the case of bilateral trade. Concluding comments are gathered in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
The model
There are n risk-neutral agents and one good. Each agent i owns a fraction ® i of the good, where 0 · ® i · 1 and P n i=1 ® i = 1. We denote by µ i the type of agent i , by µ the vector µ = (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ), and by µ ¡i the vector µ ¡i = (µ 1 ; :::; µ i¡1 ; µ i+1 ; :::; µ n ). Types are independently distributed. Type µ i is drawn according to a commonly known density function f i with support
The density f i is continuous and positive (a.e.), with distribution F i .
The valuation of agent i for the entire good is given by the function v i (µ i ; µ ¡i ) ; where the arguments are always ordered by the agents' indices: v i (µ i ; µ ¡i ) = v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ). The function v i (µ i ; µ ¡i ) is strictly increasing in µ i , and continuously di¤erentiable. We further assume the following single crossing property (SCP):
where v i;x (µ 1 ; :::µ n ) denotes the x 0 th partial derivative of v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) : This assumption 10 guarantees that the functions v i (¢; µ ¡i ) and v j (¢; µ ¡i ) are equal for at most one µ i . Agents have utility functions of the form q i v i + m i where q i and m i represent the share of the good and the money owned by i, respectively.
By the revelation principle, it su¢ces to analyze direct revelation mechanisms (DRM). In a DRM agents report their types, relinquish their shares ® i of the good, and then receive a payment t i (µ) and a share k i (µ) of the entire good. A DRM is therefore a game form ¡ = ¡£ µ 1 ; µ 1 ¤ ; :::; £ µ n ; µ n ¤ ; k; t ¢ , where k (µ) = (k 1 (µ) ; :::; k n (µ)) is a vector with components
and t (µ) = (t 1 (µ) ; :::; t n (µ)) is a vector with components t i : £ n j=1
We call the k and t the allocation rule and the payments, respectively. To simplify notation, we refer to the pair (k; t) as a DRM if it is clear which strategy sets £ µ i ; µ i ¤ are meant. A mechanism (k; t) implements the allocation rule k if truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by ¡ and by the agents' utility functions. Such a mechanism is called incentive compatible (IC). A mechanism is (ex post) e¢cient (EF) if it implements an allocation rule where the agent with the highest valuation of the good always gets the entire good 11 . A mechanism is called (ex-ante) budget balanced (BB) if a designer doesn't expect to pay subsidies to the agents, e.g.
We call a mechanism (interim) individual rational (IR) if every agent i who knows his type µ i wants to participate in the mechanism, given that all players report their types truthfully, e.g. if U i (µ i )¸0 for all µ i ; i = 1; ::; n, where U i (µ i ) is the utility type µ i expects to achieve by participating in the mechanism.
We denote characteristic functions as follows:
3 E¢ciency and incentive compatibility
Our analysis uses three main ideas ² A revenue equivalence result implies that any two EF and IC mechanisms yield, up to a constant, the same interim expected transfers.
² We display generalized Groves mechanisms that satisfy EF and IC for the case of interdependent values.
² By revenue equivalence, it is enough to check under which conditions a generalized Groves mechanism satis…es BB and IR to obtain general conditions for the existence of EF, IC BB and IR mechanisms 12 .
Krishna and Perry [1998] and Williams [1999] have used the same combination for the analysis of e¢cient trade in buyer-seller settings with private values.
The revenue equivalence theorem
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem constitutes the basis of most results in the mechanismdesign literature with quasi-linear utility functions, risk-neutral agents and independent types. It states that expected payments are (up to a constant) the same in all IC mechanisms that implement the same allocation. Its proof can be easily extended to environments with interdependent valuations 13 .
11 A more appropriate name for this property is value-maximization, since e¢ciency combines in fact all properties listed here. But we keep the common jargon. 12 Note that mechanisms that satisfy IC and EF without belonging to the CGV class do indeed exist. For instance, Cramton et al. [1987] show that a double auction (which is not a CGV mechanism) dissolves a partnership e¤ciently when agents have private values. 13 Various such extensions can be found in Myerson (1981) , Jehiel et.al. (1996) , Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) , and Krishna and Maenner (1999) . None of these results covers the present setting.
We …rst need some notation: The interim utility of agent i with type µ i which participates and announces the type b µ i (while all the other agents report truthfully) is given by
To simplify notation we write:
for every IC mechanism (k; t) ; the interim expected utility of agent i in a truth-telling equilibrium can be written as:
Corollary 1 Let (k; t) be an IC mechanism. If there is no BB and IR mechanism of the form (k; t + q) where q := (q 1 ; :::; q n ) is an arbitrary vector of constants, then there are no IR and BB mechanisms that implement k:
We now examine under which conditions we can …nd an BB and IR mechanism in the class of mechanisms of the form (k; t + q) where (k; t) is an IC mechanism. Let e µ i be the "worst o¤" type of agent i in the mechanism (k; t). This is de…ned by
Theorem 2 Let (k; t) be an IC mechanism and T i ; U i ; e µ i be the associated interim payments, interim utilities and "worst o¤" types, respectively. There exists an IC, BB and IR mechanism that implements k if and only if
The worst type's utility U i ( e µ i ) can also be viewed as a maximal entry fee that can be collected from agent i in the mechanism (k; t) such that every type of agent i still participates. If these entry fees cover the expected payments needed to ensure IC then (and only then) there exists an IR and BB mechanism that implements k. Such a mechanism is then given by (k; t + q) with q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) = (¡U 1 ( e µ 1 ); :::; ¡U n ( e µ n )):
In the sequel we focus on EF mechanisms. For a given trading situation it su¢ces to analyze the allocation rule k ¤ given by:
where m (µ) := max fjj j 2 arg max i v i (µ)g : Any two e¢cient allocation rules di¤er only in the tie breaking rule and coincide a.e. We can apply Theorem 1 for the e¢cient allocation rule k ¤ since, for all b µ i ; we have
The generalized Groves mechanism
We now display a mechanism which applies to the interdependent values case the idea behind Groves mechanisms. Variations on this idea have been used to construct valuemaximizing auctions by Ausubel [1997] , Dasgupta and Maskin [2000] , Jehiel and Moldovanu [1998] and Perry and Reny [1999] .
Theorem 3 Let k ¤ be an e¢cient allocation rule, and let the payments t ¤ be given by
if the equation has a solution, and by
14 If µ ¤ i (µ ¡i ) does not exist, it can be arbitrarily chosen out of
The de…nition given here simpli…es calculations in the next section.
15 Note that truthtelling is not an equilibrium in dominant strategies, but it is an ex-post equilibrium, i.e., it is an equilibrium no matter what the distributions of agents' types are.
The existence condition
We now have all the needed tools. Theorem 2 shows that an IC,EF,IR and BB mechanism exists if and only if
or an arbitrary IC and EF mechanism. For the mechanism constructed in Theorem 3 we have
Therefore we can …nd an IC, EF, IR and BB mechanism if and only if
Dissolving a Partnership
We now apply the above …ndings to the dissolution of a partnership. We make the following assumptions:
A1 Types are drawn independently from the same distribution function, e.g.
A2 The valuation functions v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) have the following form: v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) = g (µ i ) + P j6 =i h (µ j ), where g; h are continuously di¤erentiable, g is strictly increasing, and
To simplify notation, we write h (µ ¡i ) := P j6 =i h (µ j ) : These conditions constitute a natural and simple generalization of the symmetry assumption in Cramton et al. [1987] . Condition A2 is also needed for computational reasons: it allows an explicit characterization of the "worst o¤" participating types, which otherwise become complex functions of the model's parameters 17 (including valuation functions). 16 The existence condition for an IC, EF, IR and ex-post budget balanced mechanism is the same: by applying the ideas of Arrow [?], d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [1979] we can …nd an expected externality mechanism that is ex-post budget-balanced and results in the same interim utilities and payments as the generalized Groves mechanism. In the expected externality mechanism, however, truthtelling is not an ex-post equilibrium. 17 This assumption does not restrict a main message of this section which states that general possibility results like in private values environments cannot be achieved if valuation functions are increasing in other agents' types.
By the single crossing property and A2, we obtain: v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) > v j (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) , µ i > µ j ; (S1) v i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) = v j (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) , µ i = µ j :
An EF and IC mechanism is given by (k ¤ ; t ¤ ) of Theorem 3. Because of S1, S2 and A2 we have µ ¤ i (µ ¡i ) = max j6 =i µ j :
). 1) An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and only if:
2) The set of (® 1 ; :::; ® n ) for which EF, IC, BB and IR mechanisms exist is either empty or a symmetric, convex set around ¡ 1 n ; :::;
Condition 2 reduces to that given in Cramton et al. [1987] if g (µ i ) = µ i and h (µ i )´0. For that case, they also show that the condition is always ful…lled if
Observe that the additional term containing the common value component is negative if h 0 > 0 and positive if h 0 < 0. Cramton's et. al. [1987] result implies that, in the latter case, a partnership can be e¢ciently dissolved if the initial property rights are distributed equally:
Example 1 To see that both cases in Theorem 4-2 can occur, consider a setting with two agents such that:
Condition 2 reduces to:
The set of shares (® 1 ; ® 2 ) for which an EF, IC, IR and BB mechanism exists is empty if and only if 0 < a < 2b.
It is interesting to compare the existence condition for interdependent values with that for private values. For this purpose, consider a trading situation with two agents given by ¡ F; ® 1 ; g; h; µ; µ ¢ and two di¤erent valuation functions:
1. An interdependent valuation function v
Let (k ¤ ; t ¤ ) be a generalized Groves mechanism (which is a standard Groves mechanism for v P V i ): Observe that, for all types of agent i; the interim valuation E µ ¡i [v i (µ i ; µ ¡i )] and interim expected utility are identical in both models. Therefore the "worst o¤" types are also identical, and so are their equilibrium utilities U i ( e µ i ): Hence, in both models we can collect the same entry fee while insuring participation of all types. But, according to Theorem 3, the needed (expected) transfers in the interdependent values case are given by
whereas in the private values case they are given by
If h 0 > 0; the generalized Groves mechanism is more expensive than the standard Groves mechanism 18 , and e¢ciency is harder to achieve with interdependent values. In particular if an e¢cient mechanism exists for v IV ; then an e¢cient mechanism exists also for v P V . If h 0 < 0; exactly the opposite occurs: e¢ciency is easier to achieve with interdependent values.
Our next result shows that e¢cient trade is possible for any valuation functions where h 0 · 0 and for any distribution function F; if each individual share is not too small. For example, if there are two partners, e¢cient dissolution is always possible if the smaller share is at least 25%.
Theorem 5 Let ® 1 · ¢ ¢ ¢ · ® n , and assume that, for all i = 1; :::; n ¡ 1; we have
and for any distribution function F , the partnership can be dissolved e¢-ciently.
It is a-priori plausible that the above insight continues to hold if the derivative of the common value component is positive, but su¢ciently small. We next show, however, that this is not the case: even if that derivative is arbitrarily small but positive, there exist distribution functions such that an equal partnership cannot be dissolved e¢ciently.
Theorem 6 For any valuation function v i (µ i ; µ ¡i ) = g (µ i ) + h (µ ¡i ) with h 0 (µ ¡i ) > 0 there exists a distribution function F such that the equal partnership cannot be e¢ciently dissolved. By Theorem 4-2, for this F there is no ex-ante distribution of shares that leads to e¢cient trade.
A distribution F with the above property puts mass on types close to the extremities of the types' interval. For these types, the payment di¤erence between a standard Groves mechanism and the generalized Groves mechanism is relatively large. Since the later is much more costly, ine¢ciency occurs.
Bilateral trade
We now brie ‡y look at the case of two agents, one who a-priori owns the whole good (the seller) and another one who wants to buy the good (the buyer). We denote the agents by S and B for seller and buyer, respectively, so that i 2 fS; Bg ; ® S = 1 and ® B = 0.
For this special case the "worst o¤" types do not depend on the functional form of the valuation functions 19 , and we can allow for general valuations (as introduced in section 2).
The following Theorem 20 exhibits a condition under which e¢cient trade is possible.
Theorem 7 An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and only if
Assume that agents' valuations are increasing in other agents' types, i.e. v S;B¸0 ; v B;S0 : An EF, IC, BB and IR mechanism exists if and only if:
In other words, if valuations are increasing in the other agent's type, e¢cient trade is only possible if a price p exists such that we can always have trade at this price 21 , i.e. if.
19 The "worst o¤" seller is always a seller of type µ S and the "worst o¤" buyer is always a buyer of type µ B :
20 The proof follows the intuition used in the previous section and is ommitted here. It can be found in the discussion paper version, available from the authors. 21 In contrast to the Akerlof model, however, we cannot a-priori restrict attention to simple mechanisms that set prices.
Note also that a necessary condition for
On the other hand, if the negative dependence of agents' valuations on the other agent's type is strong enough, then e¢cient trade is possible even if the distributions of types have overlapping support (i.e., even if the possibility of e¢cient trade is not common knowledge) 22 . This phenomenon is illustrated below.
Example 2 Assume that valuations are:
with a > b; a > 0; and assume that
shows that the following mechanism is IC and EF:
Because worst-o¤ types never trade, the mechanism designer cannot collect entry fees. He has to pay (in expectation):
For b > 0 it is more costly to achieve e¢ciency than in the private values case (where the mechanism designer has to pay 1 6 a). For b = ¡a , everybody tells the truth without receiving any payments at all, so that BB and IR are also ful…lled. For b < ¡a the designer can even extract money from the traders!
Conclusion
In a recent survey of Mechanism Theory, Mat Jackson writes:
"There is still much that is not known about the existence or properties of incentive compatible mechanisms that are e¢cient 23 (much less the balanced and individual rational), when there are general forms of uncertainty and interdependencies in the preferences of individuals." (Jackson, 2000) Our study represents the …rst attempt at a systematic study of the above problems. Focusing on the possibility of e¢cient trade, we have highlighted the similarities and di¤erences between the private value case and the case with interdependent valuations.
Our analysis generalizes and uni…es several well-known results that were obtained in special cases. We showed how the comparison of the private and interdependent cases crucially depends on whether valuations are increasing or decreasing in other agents' signals.
For the Myerson-Satterthwaite and Akerlof "extreme-ownership" settings second-best mechanisms have been exhibited in the literature (see Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] , Samuelson [1984] , Gresik [1991] ). The construction of a second-best mechanisms for the partnership model with interdependent values is still an open question. First steps have been undertaken by Jehiel and Pauzner [1999] and Kittsteiner [2000] . Jehiel and Pauzner study second-best mechanisms in a setting with a single informed partner. They show that the second-best allocation method coincides with the ex-post e¢cient allocation only outside an interior interval of types where no trade takes place. Kittsteiner calculates the bidding equilibrium in a speci…c mechanism -the double auction -in the partnership model of section 4, and shows that an interior interval of types will not participate in the auction. He also shows that, in some situations, there are mechanisms which are welfare superior to the double auction 24 .
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof follows that for private values (see e.g. Myerson [1981] ). There is one additional argument needed to justify the di¤erentiation under the integral. Incentive compatibility implies:
We therefore obtain the following inequalities:
Dividing by b µ i ¡ µ i gives
24 Note that a double auction is a second-best mechanism in private values environments.
Because v i is continuously di¤erentiable and because
we can take the limit b µ i ! µ i and apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem to obtain
and therefore that U (µ i ) is di¤erentiable with
Proof of Corollary1: Fix an IC mechanism that implements k and has the payment functions t i (µ 1 ; :::; µ n ) ; i = 1; :::; n. Observe that a mechanism (k; t + r) with r = (r 1 ; :::; r n ) ; where r i is an arbitrary constant also implements k: Consider an arbitrary mechanism that implements k and has payment functions s i (µ) and interim payment functions
(µ i ) the interim equilibrium utilities of agents participating in (k; s) and (k; t + r) ; respectively. Because the interim utilities of the participating agents are (up to a constant) the same for all IC mechanisms that implement k, we can …nd constants q i such that
This means that for every IC mechanism (k; s) we can …nd a mechanism (k; t + q) that is equivalent to (k; s) in terms of interim utilities. This leads to the following important observation: If the mechanism (k; s) is BB and IR, then the mechanism (k; t + q) is also BB and IR. To check this note that U t+q i
Proof of Theorem 2: Given a mechanism (k; t) that implements k; let e µ i be the "worst o¤" type of agent i: Let q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) be a vector of constants. Because of U t+q i (µ i ) = U t i (µ i ) + q i the "worst o¤" type of player i in the mechanism (k; t + q) is also given by e µ i . We are looking for constants q i such that the mechanism (k; t + q) is BB and IR, i.e.,
³ e µ i´+ q i¸0 8i: These conditions can hold if and only if
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider agent i and assume that all agents other than i report their types µ ¡i truthfully. Assume …rst, that 8 µ i we have
0 s report does not change the allocation k ¤ : Because payments do not depend on µ i , it is optimal for i to report truthfully.
Assume now that v i (µ
and that the true type of agent i is µ i : We distinguish several cases:
does not change the allocation (agent i still gets the good) because we have Proof of Theorem 4: 1) We have to show that conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent. For this, we …rst determine the interim utilities of the "worst o¤" types and the expected payments to the agents. The interim expected utility of agent i with type µ i is given by:
The "worst o¤" type e µ i satis…es e µ i = arg min µ i U i (µ i ) : The …rst order condition of this minimization problem gives
This yields e
) . This is the only minimum because F n¡1 (µ i ) ¡ ® i is negative for µ i < e µ i and positive for µ i > e µ i . The interim utility U i ³ e µ i´i s given by
Using µ ¤ i (µ ¡i ) = max j6 =i µ j condition (1) writes:
Using separability and symmetry of the valuation functions, we obtain (for some i)
Integration by parts gives
The function Ã is symmetric in its arguments and concave (recall that ® i = F n¡1 ³ e µ i´) : Because of symmetry, Ã takes its maximum on the simplex P n i=1 ® i = 1 at 1 n ; :::; 1 n ; and the set of (® 1 ; :::; ® n ) that lead to positive values of Ã is either symmetric and convex, or empty.
Proof of Theorem 5:
We have e µ i = F ¡1 µ ® 1 n¡1 i ¶ and therefore e µ 1 · ¢ ¢ ¢ · e µ n :
Integration by parts in condition 2 yields:
e µ i g 0 (µ)
Since for all i; 1 · i · n ¡ 1; iF n¡1 (µ) ¡ (n ¡ 1) F n (µ) · ¡ i n ¢ n the last expression is non-negative.
Proof of Theorem 6:
It is su¢cient to show that for any function v i = g (µ i )+h (µ ¡i ) with h 0 > 0 there exists a distribution function F such that e¢cient trade fails for ® 1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = ® n = 1 n . Integration by parts shows that condition 2 is equivalent to: 
We …rst show that this is the case for the discontinuous distribution F ¤ given by:
We set e µ = µ because F ¤ (µ) < ¡ 1 n ¢ 1 n¡1 for all µ < 1: Calculating (3) for F ¤ yields:
We now construct a sequence o¤ cumulative distribution functions that are feasible and "arbitrarily close" to F ¤ . Therefore, such distribution functions will also violate the existence condition. Let µ M := (µ¡µ) 
For m large enough F m satis…es condition (3) , which completes the proof. 25 Observe that they are strictly increasing and di¤erentiable. 
